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973 
BUT IS IT JUST?  THE INABILITY FOR CURRENT 
ADJUDICATORY STANDARDS TO PROVIDE 




In hopes of promoting foreign direct investment, the world has 
experienced an influx of bilateral investment treaties over the past twenty 
years.  One protection these treaties afford to foreign investors is the 
guarantee of “just compensation” if the host government expropriates their 
investment, either directly or indirectly.  Extensive jurisprudence exists 
discussing how a tribunal determines “just compensation” in cases of 
expropriation; however, these methods have historically revolved around 
valuing direct expropriations.  While tribunals use these same methods to 
value indirect expropriations, analysis of these adjudications, particularly 
in the cases of a creeping expropriation, result in inconsistent and 
unpredictable outcomes. 
This Note considers two areas—timing and methodology—that have led 
to these inconsistent rulings.  The Note first discusses the current 
international standards used in these areas and then looks at alternative 
methods suggested by scholars to address the resulting inconsistencies.  It 
concludes by arguing that in cases of creeping expropriations, tribunals 
should implement some variation of these alternative methods in order to 
produce more consistent outcomes. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The fundamental economic problem of scarcity is a longstanding issue 
that society has tried to address.1  Given the world’s limited resources and 
society’s unlimited wants, it is vital to maximize material and human 
capital wherever possible.2  Many individuals propose globalization 
strategies as a means to address scarcity concerns.  One method is to entice 
investors to enter a foreign country and use their superior skills and 
knowledge to maximize production in a certain sector of the economy.3  
This method is particularly beneficial when private actors from developed 
countries enter developing countries.4  In the end, developing countries gain 
knowledge and skills to produce more efficiently and to better utilize 
limited resources.5  In return for bringing knowledge and training into the 
country, the foreign investor receives additional profits by increasing its 
capital base thanks to new market access.6  Thus, both sides benefit from 
this direct foreign investment arrangement, and society puts its scarce 
resources to better use. 
However, investor uncertainty over entering a country with unfamiliar 
laws and practices limits the amount of foreign direct investment (FDI) that 
takes place.7  In addition to encountering foreign business practices and 
laws, there is often concern over regulatory uncertainty in a developing 
country and the possibility that the foreign government will unfairly take 
away the investment from the investor.8  The ability to create an investment 
environment that rids the investor of these concerns, therefore, can more 
fully promote FDI and the economic benefits it brings. 
One effort to create this type of investment environment has been the 
mass proliferation of investment treaties between countries.9  While some 
of these treaties involve multiple countries, the vast majority have been 
bilateral investments treaties (BITs) between two countries.10  There have 
been over 2,750 BITs signed between countries, with 2009 seeing more 
 
 1. See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER, MACROECONOMICS:  PRINCIPLES AND 
POLICY 20–21 (9th ed. 2004). 
 2. See id. 
 3. See DANIEL C.K. CHOW & THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
TRANSACTIONS 371 (2d ed. 2010). 
 4. See id. 
 5. See id. at 372. 
 6. See id. 
 7. See Eric Neumayer & Laura Spess, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Increase 
Foreign Direct Investment to Developing Countries?, 33 WORLD DEV. 1567, 1567 (2005). 
 8. See Tom Ginsburg, International Substitutes for Domestic Institutions:  Bilateral 
Investment Treaties and Governance 1–2 (Ill. Law and Econ. Working Papers Series, Paper 
No. LE06-027, 2006). 
 9. See Manuel A. Abdala & Pablo T. Spiller, Damage Valuation of Indirect 
Expropriation in International Arbitration Cases, 14 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 447, 447 (2003). 
 10. See Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 16–17; see also Mariana Pargendler, State Ownership 
and Corporate Governance, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2917, 2971 (2012) (“To encourage foreign 
direct investment, governments typically enter into such commitments by signing bilateral 
investment treaties providing for international arbitration to resolve disputes.”). 
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than one new BIT per week.11  The primary purpose of BITs is to provide 
safeguards for the investments of citizens from one country that are located 
in the territory of the other country.12  These safeguards include rules 
governing the host state’s treatment of the investments and the 
establishment of dispute resolution mechanisms.13  The language and 
protections of BITs are mostly uniform,14 with one central protection being 
the guarantee of compensation in the event of expropriation by the host 
country.15  This protection encompasses both direct and indirect 
expropriations.16  Direct expropriations have historically been the most 
common form of expropriation, where the host government physically takes 
control of the asset from the foreign investor.17  However, there has 
recently been a large increase in the number of indirect expropriations, 
particularly creeping expropriations.18  A creeping expropriation occurs 
when the host country institutes a series of acts that, when aggregated, have 
the equivalent effect of depriving the owner of any benefit from the 
investment while not directly taking the asset from the foreign investor.19 
A large amount of case law, particularly arbitration case law, addresses 
providing compensation for expropriations.20  The consensus under 
 
 11. See U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev., World Investment Report 2010:  Investing in 
a Low-Carbon Economy, at 81, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2010 (July 22, 2010) (stating 
eighty-two BITs were signed in 2009 with 2,750 signed in total).  The United States recently 
entered into BITs with Rwanda and Uruguay. See Treaty Concerning the Encouragement 
and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, U.S.-Rwanda, Feb. 19, 2008, available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/bit/asset_upload_file743_14523.p
df; Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, U.S.-
Uru., Nov. 4, 2005 [hereinafter U.S.-Uruguay BIT], available at http://www.ustr.gov/
sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/bit/asset_upload_file748_9005.pdf. 
 12. See Susan D. Franck, The Nature and Enforcement of Investor Rights Under 
Investment Treaties:  Do Investment Treaties Have a Bright Future, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L 
L. & POL’Y 47, 52 (2005) (“A BIT is an agreement between two Sovereigns that safeguards 
the investments made by investors from each country in businesses or projects located in the 
other’s territories.”). 
 13. See Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The Economics of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 41 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 469, 469–70 (2000) (“In general, the agreements protect investment by 
investors of one state in the territory of another state by articulating substantive rules 
governing the host state’s treatment of the investment and by establishing dispute resolution 
mechanisms applicable to alleged violations of those rules.”). 
 14. See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 3, at 383. 
 15. See W. Michael Reisman & Rocio Digon, Eclipse of Expropriation?, in 
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION:  THE FORDHAM 
PAPERS 27, 27–28 (Arthur W. Rovine ed., 2008). 
 16. See IRMGARD MARBOE, CALCULATION OF COMPENSATION AND DAMAGES IN 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW ¶¶ 3.52–.53 (Loukas Mistelis ed., 2009). 
 17. See id. ¶ 3.03; Dictionary of Trade Terms, SICE, http://www.sice.oas.org/dictionary/
IN_e.asp (last visited Oct. 20, 2012). 
 18. See CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION:  
SUBSTANTIVE PRINCIPLES ¶ 8.02 (Loukas Mistelis et al. eds., 2007). 
 19. See Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/2, 
Arbitral Award, ¶ 17 (June 2, 2000), 15 ICSID Rev. 214 (2000) (Highet, Arb., dissenting); 
W. Michael Reisman & Robert D. Sloane, Indirect Expropriation and Its Valuation in the 
BIT Generation, 74 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 115, 123 (2004). 
 20. See Reisman & Digon, supra note 15, at 27–28. 
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international law arising from these cases is that the host country must 
provide “just compensation” to the foreign investor in the event of an 
expropriation.21  However, most international legal principles concerned 
with how to determine “just compensation” were designed to provide 
compensation for direct expropriations.22  While direct expropriations were 
at one point in time the primary mode of expropriation, this is rarely the 
case today.23  The much more common, contemporary expropriation issue 
involves indirect and creeping expropriations.24  Unfortunately, the 
principles of international law addressing how to determine “just 
compensation” do not easily apply to these forms of expropriation.25  
Attempting to apply these principles to creeping expropriation cases has 
resulted in several inconsistencies across adjudicatory bodies.26 
This Note discusses the difficulties in applying current international law 
and BIT standards to determine “just compensation” when a creeping 
expropriation occurs.  In particular, two issues have led to this problem:  
temporal inconsistencies in deciding when to value the investment and 
difficulties in applying typical valuation methods.27  Inconsistent 
application of the law undermines the purpose of BITs, which is to provide 
a structured environment that entices FDI.28  In addition to discussing how 
current standards for determining adequate compensation are unsuitable for 
creeping expropriations, this Note looks at alternative possibilities for 
determining how and when to value the taken asset.  Implementation of 
these alternative methods may provide more adjudicatory consistency when 
determining “just compensation.”  Increased consistency would then ideally 
result in more effective protection by BITs, increased foreign investment, 
and greater global economic development. 
Part I of this Note provides a thorough discussion of BITs and the 
benefits they provide, with an emphasis on the protection against 
expropriations without compensation.  It then shifts towards a discussion of 
the “just compensation” standard and the ideologies developed around what 
satisfies it.  Next, Part II discusses the inconsistencies that have arisen by 
attempting to apply the current standards for determining “just 
compensation” to incidences of creeping expropriation.  It first shows the 
conflicts that have resulted from the current “moment of expropriation” 
standard in determining the point in time in which to value the expropriated 
asset.  It then discusses the difficulties in applying various accepted 
valuation methods to creeping expropriations.  Part III considers alternative 
strategies that scholars have suggested to address these temporal and 
 
 21. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 
712(1)(c) (1987). 
 22. See infra Part II.A.2, II.B.2. 
 23. See MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 18, ¶ 8.02. 
 24. Id. 
 25. See infra Part II. 
 26. See infra Part II. 
 27. See infra Part II. 
 28. See supra notes 7–10 and accompanying text. 
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methodological issues.  Finally, Part IV asserts the need to implement some 
type of change to current practices.  It argues that each method proposed in 
Part III would help to alleviate some of the inconsistencies that currently 
exist, even if they do not completely resolve the problem.  Moreover, this 
Note proposes alternative solutions that would also provide more 
consistency in trying to determine “just compensation” for creeping 
expropriations. 
I.  THE TRENDY TREATY’S COMPENSATION PROTECTION 
This Note begins by providing a general background on BITs and the 
current international law standards for providing compensation in response 
to expropriations.  Part I.A explains the history of BITs, their general 
structure, and their purpose.  Part I.B then discusses expropriations and the 
international compensation standards developed in response to them.  
Finally, Part I.C concludes by briefly discussing how the nature of 
international courts and arbitral tribunals contribute to the question of 
determining “just compensation.” 
A.  The Trendy Treaty:  Why BITs Have Become So Popular 
This section looks at the history of BITs and discusses reasons for their 
recent popularity.  It begins by discussing the global prevalence of BITs and 
then details the structure and common provisions found in them.  Finally, 
this section discusses the benefits that BITs offer a country and its citizens, 
giving some indication as to why countries enter into these types of treaties. 
1.  The Global Proliferation of BITs 
Though they have existed for over fifty years, mass implementation of 
BITs only began in the 1990s.  The Federal Republic of Germany and the 
Islamic Republic of Pakistan signed the very first BIT in 1959.29  Like this 
first BIT, many subsequent agreements were originally signed between a 
“developed” country and a “developing” one,30 although it is also common 
to have BITs signed between two “developed” or two “developing” 
countries.31  Following a boom in the late 1990s and early 2000s, dozens of 
 
 29. See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 3, at 383. 
 30. See Amnon Lehavi, The Global Law of the Land, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 425, 449 
(2010) (“BITs were being typically signed between a developed country—the exporter of 
capital—and a developing one, so that BIT provisions were mainly placing constraints on the 
latter.”); Jeswald W. Salacuse, BIT by BIT:  The Growth of Bilateral Investment Treaties and 
Their Impact on Foreign Investment in Developing Countries, 24 INT’L LAW. 655, 656 
(1990). 
 31. See Salacuse, supra note 30, at 658–59.  For a list of BITs signed by each country, 
see ICSID Database of Bilateral Investment Treaties, INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. 
DISPUTES, http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDPublications
RH&actionVal=ViewBilateral&reqFrom=Main (last visited Oct. 20, 2012) [hereinafter 
ICSID List of BITs]; Country-Specific Lists of Bilateral Investment Treaties, U.N. 
CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=
2344&lang=1 (last visited Oct. 20, 2012) [hereinafter UNCTAD List of BITs].  Please note 
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countries have signed some form of bilateral investment treaty.32  Many 
countries have signed multiple BITs, including the United States (48), 
Germany (147), China (128), and Russia (71).33  While the contents and 
protections of BITs are mostly uniform, several attempts to make a broad 
based multilateral investment treaty between many nations have been 
unsuccessful.34  Although some multilateral investment treaties do exist—
the North American Free Trade Agreement35 (NAFTA), for example—the 
dominant approach has been to sign bilateral treaties.36 
2.  The Structure and Protection of BITs 
BITs are a popular global investment tool because they provide benefits 
to both the host37 state and the foreign investor.38  For the most part, the 
protections of BITs are identical,39 and they “tend to resemble each other in 
their purpose and content.”40  This is a result of their being derived from a 
limited number of common sources.41  The 2012 U.S. Model BIT42 serves 
as a good example of a typical BIT because it contains the five substantive 
provisions generally found in most BITs:  national treatment, most favored 
nation status, fair and equitable treatment, full protection and security, and 
protection from expropriation without compensation.43 
The first provision, national treatment, provides that no signatory to the 
BIT may treat a foreign investor less favorably than it would a domestic 
investor in like circumstances, or treat a foreign-owned investment less 
favorably than a domestically owned investment.44  The most favored 
nation provision promises investors from signatory states treatment that is 
as good as, or better than, treatment given to investors from nonsignatory 
states.45  Countries often combine the next two provisions, fair and 
 
that each organization only lists BITs that governments provide to them, and therefore both 
sources must be considered when determining all BITs that a State has entered into. 
 32. See U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev., Investor-State Dispute Settlement and 
Impact on Investment Rulemaking, at 3, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIA/2007/3 (Sept. 2007), 
available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteiia20073_en.pdf. 
 33. See ICSID List of BITs, supra note 31; UNCTAD List of BITs, supra note 31. 
 34. See Edna Sussman, A Multilateral Energy Sector Investment Treaty:  Is it Time for a 
Call for Adoption by All Nations?, 44 INT’L LAW. 939, 959 (2010). 
 35. Whereas BITs solely focus on investments, NAFTA is a treaty addressing both 
investments and trade. 
 36. See Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 16–17. 
 37. In this Note, the word “host” will refer to the member country of the bilateral 
investment treaty that holds the invested asset within its geographical territory. 
 38. See infra Part I.C. 
 39. See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 3, at 383. 
 40. MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 18, ¶ 2.05. 
 41. These sources include BIT drafts produced by the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) and a private group led by Abs and Shawcross in 1959. 
See id. 
 42. U.S. MODEL BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY (2012), [hereinafter U.S. MODEL BIT], 
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/188371.pdf.  
 43. See MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 18, ¶ 2.20. 
 44. See, e.g., U.S. MODEL BIT, supra note 42, art. 3. 
 45. See, e.g., id. art. 4. 
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equitable treatment and full protection and security, into one “minimum 
standard of treatment” provision.46  This provision requires member 
countries to provide justice in criminal, civil, and administrative 
adjudicatory proceedings that satisfies due process, and guarantees the same 
degree of police protection and security as is required by international 
law.47  The last provision is protection from expropriation without just 
compensation.48  This protection covers both direct expropriation of an 
individual’s investment, where the State “deprives a private person of his or 
her property,”49 and indirect expropriation, which is a more generalized 
version of creeping expropriation where a host country incidentally 
interferes with the use of property to the point that the interference 
significantly deprives the owner of using the investment.50  The forms of 
expropriation and the appropriate remedy for expropriatory acts are 
discussed in further detail below.51 
BITs also provide signatories and investors with several adjudicatory 
options.52  Most have some variety of forum clause that allows for 
proceedings in national courts or for international arbitration through 
neutral organizations such as the International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID) or the International Chamber of Commerce 
(ICC).53 
3.  The Reason Countries Enter into BITs 
There are several reasons why a country may desire to enter into a BIT 
with another country.  Not only are there benefits to the country as a 
sovereign nation, but the individual citizens of the country also benefit 
through their capacity as foreign investors. 
a.  Benefits to the Host Country 
BITs provide numerous benefits to host countries, particularly 
developing ones.  The primary reason that a country enters into a BIT is the 
 
 46. See, e.g., id. art. 5. 
 47. See, e.g., id. 
 48. See, e.g., id. art. 6. 
 49. MARBOE, supra note 16, ¶ 3.03. 
 50. See Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. Arb(AF)/97/1, 
Award, ¶ 103 (Aug. 30, 2000), 16 ICSID Rev. 168 (2001) (“[E]xpropriation under NAFTA 
includes . . . covert or incidental interference with the use of property which has the effect of 
depriving the owner, in whole or in significant part, of the use or reasonably-to-be-expected 
economic benefit of property even if not necessarily to the obvious benefit of the host 
State.”).  Although NAFTA is not a BIT, most general principles of BITs, including 
principles of expropriation, also apply to NAFTA and other multilateral treaties. See LUKE 
ERIC PETERSON, RIGHTS & DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND BILATERAL INVESTMENT 
TREATIES 22 (2009), http://www.law.utoronto.ca/documents/ihrp/LukePetersonReport.pdf. 
 51. See infra Part I.B. 
 52. See Franck, supra note 12, at 54 (“Investors now regularly bring investment claims, 
in part because this direct action lets investors choose where they will bring their claims.”). 
 53. See id. 
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hope of attracting increased FDI, which may result in new sources of 
capital, new technology from investors, new jobs and training that increase 
human capital, and greater access to international markets.54  Increases to 
FDI, and subsequent increases in capital assets, allows for free flowing 
capital, which improves productivity and accounts for the majority of 
economic growth in non-Western countries according to some economic 
models.55  Whether BITs do in fact promote additional FDI is beyond the 
scope of this Note,56 but a survey conducted by the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) showed that investors 
rank BITs as an important factor in investment decision making.57  A 
country that has entered into BITs is therefore sending a signal to investors 
that they offer an investment environment with desirable benefits.58  This 
signal may serve as a great advantage to developing countries, which are 
continually competing against each other for the investment of developed 
nations.59 
BITs may also provide positive benefits to the host country’s image.  The 
protections provided by BITs may represent that investors are getting a 
better bargain for an investment that would have occurred anyway.60  
Moreover, entering into BITs may portray the country as “modern” because 
“BITs became ‘the thing to do’ for developing countries in the 1990s.”61  
Additionally, while BITs do limit the legislation a country can implement, 
they serve as an incentive to prevent either current governments or future 
 
 54. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Regulating Multinational Corporations:  Towards Principles 
of Cross-Border Legal Frameworks in a Globalized World Balancing Rights with 
Responsibilities, 23 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 451, 453 (2008). 
 55. See Vandevelde, supra note 13, at 478–79 (discussing the Liberal Economic 
Model’s predictions of FDI impacts on non-Western countries). 
 56. Empirical studies have come to conflicting conclusions on this issue. Compare Mary 
Hallward-Driemeier, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Attract FDI?  Only a Bit . . . and They 
Could Bite, WORLD BANK’S DEV. RES. GROUP (June 2003), http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2003/09/23/000094946_0
3091104060047/additional/105505322_20041117160010.pdf (finding minimal impact of 
BITs on FDI), and Jennifer Tobin & Susan Rose-Ackerman, Foreign Direct Investment and 
the Business Environment in Developing Countries:  The Impact of Bilateral Investment 
Treaties (Yale Law Sch. Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Pub. Policy, Research Paper No. 293, 2005), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=557121 (finding a very weak relationship between BITs 
and FDI), with Peter Egger & Michael Pfaffermayr, The Impact of Bilateral Investment 
Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment, 32 J. COMP. ECON. 788 (2004), available at 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0147596704000526 (finding BITs exert a 
significant positive effect on outward FDI). 
 57. See Sussman, supra note 34, at 953 (citing U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev., The 
Role of International Investment Agreements in Attracting Foreign Direct Investment to 
Developing Countries, at 51–52, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2009/5 (Sept. 2009), 
available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/diaeia20095_en.pdf). 
 58. See Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 19 (“[O]ne might see the BIT as a signal, either to 
foreign investors or to domestic audiences, that the government plans to pursue a liberal 
economic policy.”). 
 59. See Stiglitz, supra note 54, at 490. 
 60. See Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 20. 
 61. Id. at 19. 
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regimes from committing actions that break previous promises, making 
these promises more credible.62 
b.  Benefits to Foreign Investors 
BITs also provide several benefits to foreign investors.  First, they 
provide a level of security to enter new markets by alleviating the fear of 
unfairly losing one’s investment, particularly in countries where the fear of 
expropriation had previously deterred a significant level of investment.63  A 
similar benefit is that BITs provide protection from discrimination or unfair 
treatment in comparison to domestic investors.64 
Third, BIT protections increase the likelihood that investors will maintain 
control over their investment.65  FDI is desirable to many investors because 
it offers them not only the opportunity for a return on an investment but 
also managerial control over that investment.66  Control provides investors 
unique opportunities to increase their return by possessing decision-making 
authority over matters such as production costs.67  Because of the BIT, an 
investor’s control over the asset is protected from injurious actions by the 
current government or any future governments.68  In essence, BITs serve as 
an insurance policy in the event of unfavorable government actions.69 
A fourth benefit that BITs provide to foreign investors is access to courts 
and the ability to bring claims against the host country on their own.70  
Previously, if an investor had a cause of action against the host country, she 
needed to rely on her home government to espouse the claim on her 
behalf.71  BITs removed this requirement and allowed the investor to bring 
the claim at her own cost.72  Ideally, this allows for more expedient 
resolutions and higher quality claims.73 
While countries enter into BITs to take advantage of many benefits that 
increase the possibility of FDI, benefits from BITs also extend to the 
 
 62. See Stiglitz, supra note 54, at 490–91. 
 63. See Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 3. 
 64. See LUKE ERIC PETERSON, FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG, BILATERAL INVESTMENT 
TREATIES—IMPLICATIONS FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND OPTIONS FOR REGULATION 2 
(2007), available at http://www.fes-globalization.org/publications/ConferenceReports/FES
%20CR%20Berlin_Peterson.pdf. 
 65. See Vandevelde, supra note 13, at 473. 
 66. Id. 
 67. See id. at 473–76 (discussing two ways that production costs may be reduced 
through control). 
 68. See Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 11; see also Stiglitz, supra note 54, at 490–91 
(arguing that BITs increase the cost of abrogating prior promises to protect foreign 
investors). 
 69. See Stiglitz, supra note 54, at 465. 
 70. See PETERSON, supra note 50, at 16; see also Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 2 (stating 
BITs offer a novel right that allows “private investors to bring suit against a sovereign 
state”). 
 71. See MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 18, ¶ 1.03. 
 72. See Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 11–12. 
 73. See id. 
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citizens of these countries, particularly when they act as foreign investors.  
Of the various benefits that BITs provide to investors, the most important 
one may be protection against expropriation without compensation.  This 
Note now provides a deeper look at this topic. 
B.  The Concern of Expropriation and BIT’s Powers Against It 
This section introduces the concept of expropriation and presents how 
BITs support the victims of expropriation by guaranteeing compensation. 
First, it discusses expropriation in general and then focuses on indirect 
expropriation specifically.  Next, it explains the “just compensation 
standard” prescribed by BITs in response to an expropriation.  This section 
then provides a history of the two competing ideologies on what this 
standard means.  Finally, it introduces the practical means of achieving 
“just compensation” through asset valuation. 
1.  Expropriation and Its Many Forms 
While the definition of an expropriation tends to vary, the general 
concept of expropriation is clear:  an expropriation is a governmental taking 
of property for which compensation is required.74  However, expropriation 
is a broad category in which several different actions may fall.75  As 
mentioned previously, the most well-known form of expropriation is a 
direct expropriation.76  The concept of a direct expropriation is similar to 
eminent domain in the domestic setting.77  The government assuming 
control does not automatically mean that it has expropriated the asset, 
though.  This conclusion is warranted only when “the owner [i]s deprived 
of [the] fundamental rights of ownership and it appears that this deprivation 
is not merely ephemeral.”78  Thus, a temporary taking does not necessarily 
mean that there was an expropriation. 
An asset that is not directly expropriated falls into the category of an 
indirect expropriation.  This form of expropriation occurs when the host 
country takes measures (often through regulatory means) that, while not 
taking title of the asset from the foreign investor, typically have an 
equivalent effect.79  Essentially, the host country’s actions have rendered 
 
 74. See MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 18, ¶ 8.03. 
 75. See id. 
 76. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 77. Eminent Domain consists of “[t]he inherent power of a governmental entity to take 
privately owned property, esp. land, and convert it to public use, subject to reasonable 
compensation for the taking.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 601 (9th ed. 2009). 
 78. Tippetts v. TAMS-AFFA Consulting Eng’rs of Iran, 6 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 219, 
225 (1984). 
 79. See Catharine Yannaca-Small, “Indirect Expropriation” and the “Right to 
Regulate” in International Investment Law, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW:  A 
CHANGING LANDSCAPE 43, 46–47 (2005), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/
11/53/40077899.pdf; cf. PETERSON, supra note 50, at 14 (discussing a growing concern over 
how to define “indirect expropriation” so that some regulatory measures that have an impact 
on the profitability of an investment are permissible and not deemed expropriations). 
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the rights to the investment so useless that the host country is deemed to 
have expropriated it.80  In addition to the word “indirect,” the international 
investment community also often refers to this form of expropriation as “de 
facto,” “disguised,” “constructive,” or that the measures taken are 
“tantamount” to an expropriation.81  Joseph Stiglitz provides a fairly 
straightforward example of an indirect expropriation that may clarify this 
concept: 
[E]very country can take actions that decrease the value of an asset—so 
much so that they are tantamount to expropriation.  For example, an 
individual has beachfront property on which he plans to build a house.  
The government decides that there is a public good in ensuring that the 
beachfront remains pristine, and therefore decides that no house can be 
built upon it.  However, it leaves the individual as the owner; he can 
prevent others from trespassing on his property.  But his use of the 
property is so circumscribed that the value of the land has been greatly 
diminished.82 
This example portrays how a single act by the host country can make an 
asset valueless to the owner despite retaining legal title to the asset. 
Since many governmental actions have a positive net social benefit 
despite hurting some parties, it is unclear what constitutes an indirect 
expropriation versus a legitimate government action.  The United States, as 
shown in the United States-Uruguay BIT, declares that determining whether 
an action constitutes an indirect expropriation requires a case-by-case, fact-
based inquiry.83  Some factors to consider include the economic impact of 
the government action, the degree to which the action interferes with 
investment-backed expectations, and the character of the government 
action.84 
While any indirect expropriation is troublesome, a more problematic 
form is a creeping expropriation.  A creeping expropriation is a specific 
type of indirect expropriation where a series of acts deprive the investor of 
her investment only when the effects of those acts are aggregated.85  If one 
or two events in the series can be determined as the factors that destroyed 
the investment’s value, then it may be misleading to deem this a “creeping 
expropriation.”86  The tribunal in Siemens A.G. v. Argentine Republic87 
reiterated this concept when it stated: 
 
 80. See U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev., Taking of Property, at 2, U.N. Doc. 
UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/15 (Jan. 2000), available at http://unctad.org/en/docs/psiteiitd15.en.pdf 
(“Certain governmental measures may not involve an actual physical taking of property, but 
may still result in the effective loss of management, use or control, or a significant 
depreciation of the value, of the assets of a foreign investor.”); G.C. Christie, What 
Constitutes a Taking Under International Law?, 38 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 307, 311 (1962). 
 81. See MARBOE, supra note 16, ¶ 3.51; Yannaca-Small, supra note 79, at 47. 
 82. See Stiglitz, supra note 54, at 513. 
 83. See U.S.-Uruguay BIT, supra note 11, Annex B. 
 84. See id. 
 85. See Reisman & Sloane, supra note 19, at 123. 
 86. See Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case 
No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, ¶ 114 (May 29, 2003), 19 ICSID Rev. 158 (2004); Compañia 
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By definition, creeping expropriation refers to a process, to steps that 
eventually have the effect of an expropriation.  If the process stops before 
it reaches that point, then expropriation would not occur.  This does not 
necessarily mean that no adverse effects would have occurred.  
Obviously, each step must have an adverse effect but by itself may not be 
significant or considered an illegal act.  The last step in a creeping 
expropriation that tilts the balance is similar to the straw that breaks the 
camel’s back.  The preceding straws may not have had a perceptible effect 
but are part of the process that led to the break.88 
For example, consider an individual who owns a rubber plant in a foreign 
country.  The plant is operating profitably, but then the foreign government 
institutes several policy measures that affect all economic activity.  The first 
measure reduces the number of hours an employee may legally work per 
week to thirty-eight hours and overtime is no longer permitted.  As a result, 
the plant owner must reduce total hours of production.  Several months 
later, a second policy measure puts a cap on plant emissions, which forces 
the owner to reduce the quantity of rubber produced.  A year later, the State 
then requires the owner to increase the social security contributions it 
makes for its employees, further reducing revenues.  Each measure on its 
own is not enough to significantly harm the plant owner, but when all three 
are combined it is no longer profitable to continue operating the rubber 
plant.  Thus, while the individual owner is still in physical possession of the 
facility, the various policy measures made the investment worthless. 
Policy makers may argue that such measures are necessary to protect the 
public interest; however, one can see the potential grounds to argue that a 
creeping expropriation has occurred.  Because creeping expropriations are 
distinct in that they occur gradually over time, they cause unique 
adjudicatory problems given the current state of international law, 
particularly in the realm of valuation and the related issue of timing.89  
Moreover, while direct expropriations have become rather rare in recent 
years, international courts and tribunals are beginning to see a higher 
prevalence of indirect expropriation claims.90 
Whether dealing with direct or indirect expropriation, it is important to 
note that governmental intent is less important than the effects of the act on 
 
del Desarrollo de Santa Elena S.A. v. Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. ARB/96/1, 
Final Award, ¶ 76 (Feb. 17, 2000), 15 ICSID Rev. 169 (2000); Reisman & Sloane, supra 
note 19, at 123. 
 87. ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Award, (Feb. 2007). 
 88. Id. ¶ 263. 
 89. See Reisman & Sloane, supra note 19, at 125–27; infra Part II. 
 90. See MARBOE, supra note 16, ¶ 3.51; cf. Peter B. Rutledge, TRIPS and BITs:  An 
Essay on Compulsory Licenses, Expropriation, and International Arbitration, 13 N.C. J.L. & 
TECH. ONLINE 149 (2012) (arguing for the use of arbitration panels in patent disputes 
because the issuance of some compulsory patent licenses could constitute an indirect 
expropriation). 
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the foreign investor.91  International law requires compensation for the act 
when the host state interferes with the use of an investment or deprives the 
owner of the fundamental rights of ownership, no matter if it intended this 
result or not.92  As this Note shall now explain, BITs explicitly state this 
international law requirement. 
2.  The Guarantee of Compensation for Expropriation 
One of the common BIT safeguards is protection from expropriation 
without compensation.93  BITs typically include this protection as its own 
provision, as seen in the 2012 U.S. Model BIT.94  Article 6(1) of this 
document states: 
Article 6:  Expropriation and Compensation 
1. Neither Party may expropriate or nationalize a covered investment 
either directly or indirectly through measures equivalent to expropriation 
or nationalization (“expropriation”), except: 
(a) for a public purpose; 
(b) in a non-discriminatory manner; 
(c) on payment of prompt, adequate, and effective compensation; and 
(d) in accordance with due process of law and Article 5 [Minimum 
Standard of Treatment](1) through (3).95 
The above passage makes three points.  First, expropriations are lawful as 
long as four elements are satisfied.96  In general, BITs and customary 
international law do not prohibit countries from expropriating foreign 
investments as long as the taking occurred for a public purpose, on a 
nondiscriminatory basis, in accordance with due process of law, and 
compensation was provided.97  The Third Restatement of Foreign Relations 
Law of the United States also recognizes the lawfulness of expropriations as 
long as these elements are satisfied.98 
 
 91. See Tippetts v. TAMS-AFFA Consulting Eng’rs of Iran, 6 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 
219, 225–26 (1986); Christie, supra note 80, at 311 (“[A] State may expropriate property, 
where it interferes with it, even though the State expressly disclaims any such intention.”). 
 92. See Tippetts, 6 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 225. 
 93. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 94. U.S. MODEL BIT, supra note 42. 
 95. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 96. Id. 
 97. See REPUBLIC OF S. AFR., BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY POLICY FRAMEWORK 
REVIEW:  GOVERNMENT POSITION PAPER 40 (2009), available at http://www.pmg.org.za/
files/docs/090626trade-bi-lateralpolicy.pdf; see also MARBOE, supra note 16, ¶ 3.05 
(discussing the role of compensation as one of the four elements that makes an expropriation 
lawful versus unlawful); Yannaca-Small, supra note 79, at 45. 
 98. Section 712 of the Restatement asserts:  “A state is responsible under international 
law for injury resulting from:  (1) a taking by the state of the property of a national of 
another state that (a) is not for a public purpose, or (b) is discriminatory, or (c) is not 
accompanied by provision for just compensation . . . .” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 712(1) (1987). 
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Next, the Model BIT states that this rule requiring all four elements be 
satisfied for a lawful expropriation applies to both direct and indirect 
expropriations.99  Because of this standard, it is generally viewed that most 
indirect or creeping expropriations have to be considered unlawful.100  By 
the very nature of indirect expropriations, though, one of the four elements 
is usually missing, typically the accompaniment of compensation or due 
process of law elements.101  It is unsettled, however, whether tribunals 
should alter damages awards based on if the asset was lawfully or 
unlawfully expropriated.102 
Additionally, while BITs explicitly state that they protect against 
uncompensated indirect expropriations, they typically provide only general 
definitions of what is an expropriation, making it difficult for adjudicators 
to determine when a legal act has occurred versus an illegal 
expropriation.103  Some countries state that governmental acts designed to 
address legitimate public welfare concerns, such as health, safety, land 
reform, and environmental issues, do not constitute expropriations either 
directly or indirectly.104  However, if there is evidence that the government 
implemented these policies in bad faith or on a discriminatory basis then a 
court or tribunal may nonetheless find an expropriation.105  The issue over 
when an act crosses the line and becomes expropriatory, especially in the 
context of indirect expropriation, continues to be a lively and heavily 
contested debate that is beyond the scope of this Note.106 
A third important point shown in both the U.S. Model BIT and the 
Restatement is that a host country is required to provide “just 
 
 99. U.S. MODEL BIT, supra note 42, art. 6; accord MARBOE, supra note 16, ¶ 3.53. 
 100. See MARBOE, supra note 16, ¶ 3.54. 
 101. See Sedco, Inc. v Nat’l Iranian Oil Co., 10 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 180, 206 n.42 
(1986) (Brower, Arb., concurring) (“By definition it is difficult to envision a de facto or 
‘creeping’ expropriation ever being lawful, for the absence of a declared intention to 
expropriate almost certainly implies that no contemporaneous provision for compensation 
has been made. Indeed, research reveals no international precedent finding such an 
expropriation to have been lawful.”). 
 102. See MARBOE, supra note 16, ¶¶ 3.75–.77; SERGEY RIPINSKY & KEVIN WILLIAMS, 
DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 65–69 (2008); cf. MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra 
note 18, ¶ 9.67. 
 103. See MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 18, ¶ 8.03. 
 104. See CANADA MODEL BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY annex B.13(1)(c) (2004), 
[hereinafter CANADIAN MODEL BIT], available at http://italaw.com/documents/Canadian
2004-FIPA-model-en.pdf; U.S. MODEL BIT, supra note 42, annex B; LUKE ERIC PETERSON, 
FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG, SOUTH AFRICA’S BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES:  
IMPLICATIONS FOR DEVELOPMENT AND HUMAN RIGHTS 24 (2006), http://library.fes.de/pdf-
files/iez/global/04137-20080708.pdf (stating that governments often argue that BIT 
provisions on expropriation must not prejudice a government’s power to regulate the 
economy in a good-faith and nondiscriminatory manner). 
 105. See CANADIAN MODEL BIT, supra note 104, annex B.13(1)(c). 
 106. For a brief introduction to this debate see, for example, Michael G. Parisi, Moving 
Toward Transparency? An Examination of Regulatory Takings in International Law, 19 
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 383 (2005); Yannaca-Small, supra note 79, at 43–72. 
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compensation” in response to an expropriation.107  The policy behind this 
rule is sensible because without compensation an expropriation acts as a 
nonvoluntary transfer of resources from a private owner to the public, and 
the possibility of this occurring with no recourse creates a disincentive to 
invest.108 
However, what satisfies “just compensation?”  This question essentially 
breaks down into two different inquiries:  (1) What is the proper standard 
of compensation; and (2) What is the proper method of compensation?109  
While the next section discusses the state of the law regarding the first 
question, the answer to the second question is unclear as it pertains to 
creeping expropriation.  Parts II, III, and IV address this second question in 
detail. 
3.  The Principle of Full Compensation and 
Competing Ideologies to Satisfy It 
The first step to conclude what satisfies “just compensation” requires 
determining the proper standard of compensation.  Case law has served as 
an initial guide in answering this question, but efforts to further refine the 
case law saw the emergence of two competing ideologies—the Hull 
Formula and Calvo Doctrine—that jockeyed for global acceptance for much 
of the twentieth century. 
a.  The Full Compensation Principle 
International law provides a starting point to determine the appropriate 
standard to provide “just compensation.”  International law holds that the 
proper standard for compensation must be to put the investor in the position 
he would have been in but for the expropriatory event.110  The Factory at 
Chorzów111 (Chorzów Factory) initially laid out this rule, which holds that 
“reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the 
illegal act and reestablish the situation which would, in all probability, have 
existed if that act had not been committed.”112  The Tribunal in Amoco 
 
 107. See supra notes 94–98 and accompanying text; cf. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or 
shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”). 
 108. See Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 9. 
 109. See Peter C. Choharis, U.S. Courts and the International Law of Expropriation:  
Toward a New Model For Breach of Contract, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 36 (2006) (“Only a few 
U.S. courts have even considered the issue of the amount of compensation necessary to 
negate a finding of expropriation, and when they have, they overwhelmingly focused on the 
standard of compensation.  McKesson is one of the few cases actually to calculate damages 
. . . .”). 
 110. See Am. Mfg. & Trading v. Zaire, ICSID Case No. ARB/93/1, Award, ¶ 6.21 (Feb. 
1997), 5 ICSID Rep. 14 (2002) (“[The question] is how the Tribunal should proceed to 
assess the amount of compensation or indemnification required by international law in order 
to restore to AMT the conditions previously existing as if the events had never occurred or 
taken place.”). 
 111. (Ger. v. Pol.), Judgment, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17 (Sept. 13). 
 112. Id. at 47. 
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International Finance v. Iran113 noted that this principle is still the reigning 
law despite the case being almost sixty years old.114  Therefore, under 
international law, a country provides “just compensation” when the 
Chorzów Factory standard of full compensation is satisfied. 
b.  Competing Compensation Standards:  The Hull and Calvo Ideologies 
While the general consensus is that the Chorzów Factory standard must 
be satisfied to provide “just compensation,” there are two competing 
ideologies as to what level of compensation meets this standard.  These 
ideologies are identified as the Hull Formula and the Calvo Doctrine, 
respectively.115  The Hull Formula is considered a pro-investor standard 
whereas the Calvo Doctrine is a pro-host state or pro-developing country 
standard.116 
The Hull Formula stems from disputes between the United States and 
Mexico over expropriation of U.S.-owned agricultural property and oil 
fields following the Mexican Revolution of 1910–1920.117  It was in the 
context of these expropriations that U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull 
argued that countries that expropriate property are required to provide just 
compensation that is “prompt, adequate and effective.”118  Many BITs, 
particularly German and American treaties have elaborated on the meaning 
of these adjectives.119  “Prompt” tends to mean that interest shall accrue 
from the date of expropriation and is included in any agreement or award of 
compensation.120  “Adequate” is usually defined as the “fair market value” 
or “market value” before the expropriation occurred, and excludes any 
changes in value resulting from knowledge of the expropriation before it 
occurred.121  Lastly, “effective” means that the compensation must be in a 
medium that is freely usable or convertible by the investor.122  The 
 
 113. 15 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 189 (1987). 
 114. See id. ¶ 191 (“In spite of the fact that it is nearly sixty years old, [Chorzów Factory] 
is widely regarded as the most authoritative exposition of the principles applicable in this 
field, and is still valid today.”). 
 115. See Vicki L. Been & Joel C. Beauvais, The Global Fifth Amendment:  NAFTA’s 
Investment Protections and the Misguided Quest for an International “Regulatory Takings” 
Doctrine 15–16 (N.Y.U. Ctr. for Law & Bus., Working Paper No. CLB-02-06, 2006), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=337480. 
 116. See Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 5–6. 
 117. See Hilary Heilbron, Assessing Damages in International Arbitration:  Practical 
Considerations, in THE LEADING ARBITRATORS’ GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 
445, 458 (Lawrence W. Newman & Richard D. Hill eds., 2d ed. 2008); Tali Levy, NAFTA’s 
Provision for Compensation in the Event of Expropriation:  A Reassessment of the “Prompt, 
Adequate and Effective” Standard, 31 STAN. J. INT’L L. 423, 424–29 (1995) (providing a 
detailed history of Hull’s communications with Mexico over this issue). 
 118. Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 6. 
 119. See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 3, at 386. 
 120. See id. 
 121. See id. 
 122. See id. 
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definition of “prompt, adequate, and effective” favors developed countries 
since they are more likely to export capital than import it.123 
Capital importing countries, typically developing ones, attempted to 
dispute the Hull Formula as the proper standard for just compensation under 
international law.124  Carlos Calvo, an Argentine jurist, formulated the 
standard that these states desired.125  Calvo argued that international law 
only requires countries to give aliens rights that are equal to those given to 
its citizens.126  Therefore, the proper standard for compensating 
expropriation is merely the equivalent of national treatment,127 which may 
warrant a lower level of compensation than the Hull Formula requires. 
While developed countries supported the Hull Formula, most developing 
nations supported the Calvo Doctrine, and through resolutions in the 1960s 
and 1970s, the United Nations chose to side with Calvo.128  In 1962, the 
U.N. General Assembly adopted the Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty 
over Natural Resources,129 which allowed for nationalization of foreign-
owned property as long as the nationalizing country provided “appropriate 
compensation.”130  This standard was an attempt to find middle ground 
between developed and developing countries,131 because the ambiguity 
provided by the word “appropriate” allowed for some to argue that less than 
full compensation was permitted under certain circumstances.132  However, 
the Hull Formula was rejected outright in 1974 when the General Assembly 
adopted the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States.133  Article 
2(c) of this resolution maintained the “appropriate compensation” standard 
but went on to state that “[i]n any case where the question of compensation 
gives rise to a controversy, it shall be settled under the domestic law of the 
nationalizing State and by its tribunals.”134  This resolution therefore 
explicitly adopted Calvo’s national treatment standard over Hull’s standard. 
Hull proponents did not take this defeat lying down, though.  Six 
developed countries, including the United States, rejected Article 2.135  
Moreover, during this same period developed countries began signing BITs 
 
 123. See Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 6. 
 124. See Kaj Hober, Investment Arbitration in Eastern Europe:  Recent Cases on 
Expropriation, 14 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 377, 386 (2003). 
 125. See Been & Beauvais, supra note 115, at 15–16. 
 126. See id. at 15. 
 127. See id. 
 128. See Yannaca-Small, supra note 79, at 44 n.1. 
 129. G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), U.N. GAOR, 17th Sess., Supp. No. 17, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/1803 (Dec. 14, 1962), available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/
GEN/NR0/193/11/PDF/NR019311.pdf?OpenElement. 
 130. Id. at 15. 
 131. Yannaca-Small, supra note 79, at 44 n.1. 
 132. See RIPINSKY & WILLIAMS, supra note 102, at 73. 
 133. G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX), U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, U.N. Doc. A/9946 
(Dec. 12, 1974), available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/
738/83/IMG/NR073883.pdf?OpenElement; see Yannaca-Small, supra note 79, at 44 n.1. 
 134. Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, supra note 133, at 52. 
 135. See Been & Beauvais, supra note 115, at 16. 
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with developing countries.136  They used this opportunity as a means to 
reinstill the Hull Formula, and by the 1980s most countries had converged 
on a single model for BITs containing Hull’s “prompt, adequate, and 
effective” language.137 
c.  The Current Prowess of Hull and the Lingering of Calvo 
It is understandable why the consensus amongst BITs is to embrace the 
Hull Formula.  Given that the primary purpose of BITs is to promote 
foreign investment, it is reasonable to adopt the compensation standard that 
best achieves this end by favoring investors.138  Moreover, capital-
exporting states drove the movement to enter BITs, and they 
understandably sought to have the language of these treaties be in terms 
most favorable to their citizens.139  These countries thus utilized BITs as a 
means to provide their citizens with stronger protections than international 
law was willing to recognize through the Calvo Doctrine.140 
The mass proliferation of BITs utilizing the Hull Formula has caused 
some commentators to declare the Calvo Doctrine, and therefore the debate 
over the proper standard to determine just compensation, dead.141  In 
addition to the BITs signed by developed countries, several BITs between 
Latin American countries (the strongest proponents of the Calvo Doctrine) 
and between other developing countries embrace the Hull Formula.142  
Examples include the BIT between Argentina and El Salvador,143 between 
Ethiopia and Sudan,144 and between the Russian Federation and Turkey.145 
However, there is evidence of continued use of Calvo’s national 
treatment standard, indicating that the debate is not yet over.146  First, it is 
argued that the national treatment ideology is visible in several Latin 
American countries based on constitutional interpretations of BITs and 
legislative measures taken in response to them.147  Second, advocates argue 
 
 136. See id. at 17; Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 8. 
 137. See Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 8. 
 138. See MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 18, ¶ 9.09. 
 139. See Salacuse, supra note 30, at 661. 
 140. See Levy, supra note 117, at 437. 
 141. See Wenhua Shan, From “North-South Divide” to “Private-Public Debate”:  
Revival of the Calvo Doctrine and the Changing Landscape in International Investment Law, 
27 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 631, 631 n.1 (2007). 
 142. See MARBOE, supra note 16, ¶ 3.16. 
 143. Agreement Regarding the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, 
Arg.-El Sal., art. 7, May 9, 1996, available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/
bits/argen_elsalvador_sp.pdf. 
 144. Agreement on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investment, Eth.-Sudan, 
art. 4, Mar. 7, 2000, available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/ethiopia_
sudan.pdf. 
 145. Agreement Regarding the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, 
Russ.-Turk., art. 6, Dec. 15, 1997, available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/
bits/russia_turkey.pdf. 
 146. See Wenhua Shan, Is Calvo Dead?, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 123, 141–42 (2007). 
 147. See generally Shan, supra note 141, at 631. 
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that a lower standard for “just compensation,” at least in terms of indirect 
expropriation, may be appropriate.148  Joseph Stiglitz argues that a country 
should be permitted to pass regulations that it believes in good faith will 
improve economic efficiency even if there are ancillary effects on income 
distribution.149  The requirement to compensate those who are adversely 
affected may incentivize the country not to implement these regulations at 
the expense of economic efficiency or to the detriment of its citizenry as a 
whole (such as environmental regulations that lead to indirect 
expropriations).150  Irmgard Marboe similarly points out that use of the Hull 
formula may limit a country’s sovereign right to regulate the use of 
property with regard to environmental or social standards.151  If tribunals 
deem a country’s regulations to cause indirect expropriations then the 
country may face high financial burdens through large damages awards.152  
Such high compensation awards can pose a problem for relatively small 
countries,153 and the inability for countries to meet this burden may warrant 
a standard below the Hull Formula when providing compensation.154 
4.  Achieving “Just Compensation” by Determining the Asset’s Value 
As discussed above, despite the continued debate between the Hull 
Formula and Calvo Doctrine, the vast majority of BITs explicitly state 
Hull’s “prompt, adequate, and effective” standard as the appropriate 
benchmark for providing just compensation.155  In addition to this language, 
most BITs provide further guidance and state that the amount of 
compensation is determined through the notion of asset valuation.156  
Though various terms are used, the majority of BITs state that proper value 
is given by providing “fair market value.”157  Many other BITs use terms 
 
 148. See, e.g., MARBOE, supra note 16, ¶¶ 3.11–.13; OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL 
LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 324 (1991); Stiglitz, supra note 54, at 514–15. 
 149. See Stiglitz, supra note 54, at 514–15 (arguing that BITs intrude on the rights of a 
country to self-governance). 
 150. See id. (providing theoretical reasons for why a country should be able to adopt 
regulations without compensating those adversely affected). 
 151. See MARBOE, supra note 16, ¶¶ 3.11–.13. 
 152. See id. ¶ 3.13. 
 153. See id. ¶ 3.12. (citing CME Czech BV (The Netherlands) v. Czech Republic, Final 
Award on Damages, (Mar. 14, 2003), 9 ICSID Rep. 264 (2006) (separate opinion of 
Arbitrator Brownlie)). 
 154. See SCHACHTER, supra note 148, at 324 (stating that the standard for “appropriate” 
or “just” compensation leaves considerable latitude to an arbiter or the parties in negotiation, 
and that some governments maintain that it would not be inappropriate or unjust to reduce 
the amount of compensation in some circumstances). 
 155. See supra note 137 and accompanying text. 
 156. See RIPINSKY & WILLIAMS, supra note 102, at 79. 
 157. See MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 18, ¶ 9.12; RIPINSKY & WILLIAMS, supra note 
102, at 79; see also, e.g., U.S.-Uruguay BIT, supra note 11; Agreement on the Promotion 
and Protection of Investments, S. Kor.-S. Afr., art. 5, July 7, 1995, available at 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/korea_southafrica.pdf; Treaty Concerning 
the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, U.S.-Arg., art. 4(1), Nov. 14, 
1991 [hereinafter U.S.-Argentina BIT], available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/
docs/bits/argentina_us.pdf. 
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such as “market value,” “actual value,” “genuine value,” and “just value,” 
but these are generally seen as equivalents of each other.158  International 
law also recognizes fair market value as the common valuation standard to 
provide “just compensation.”159  In Vivendi v. Argentina,160 the tribunal 
found “fair market value” to be equivalent to the applicable BIT’s term of 
“actual value.”161  Similarly, the tribunal in McKesson Corp. v. Islamic 
Republic of Iran162 held that proper compensation is “full value,” which is 
usually the “fair market value.”163  Additionally, the Restatement affirms 
these opinions, stating that “there must be payment for the full value of the 
property, usually ‘fair market value’ where that can be determined.”164 
While the consensus finds that “just compensation” is met by providing 
the fair market value, there is limited authority that customary international 
law allows for less than market value in some circumstances.165  For 
example, Professor Oscar Schachter argues that for BITs which do not use 
the term “fair market value,” but simply refer to “just” or “equitable” 
compensation, a large-scale expropriation such as land reform or 
environmental regulations might allow for less than market value 
compensation to prevent overly burdening the host country.166 
In summary, international law and investment treaty law generally 
conclude that a tribunal has awarded “just compensation” when the 
Chorzów Factory standard (i.e., providing full compensation that wipes out 
all consequences of an illegal act) is satisfied.167  While there are competing 
ideologies as to the level of compensation needed to meet this standard, the 
leading view found in the majority of BITs is Hull’s “prompt, adequate, and 
effective” standard.168  Moreover, the practical means of determining an 
 
 158. See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 3, at 386; RIPINSKY & WILLIAMS, supra note 
102, at 183; see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 77, at 675 (defining fair market 
value). 
 159. See RIPINSKY & WILLIAMS, supra note 102, at 79; see also, e.g., SEDCO, Inc. v. 
Nat’l Iranian Oil Co., 10 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 180, 193 (1986) (Brower, Arb., 
concurring); INA Corp. v. Iran, 8 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 373, 378–79 (1985). 
 160. Compañía de Aguas Del Aconquija S.A. v. Argentine Republic (Vivendi v. 
Argentina), ICSID Case No. Arb/97/3, Award (Aug. 20, 2007). 
 161. See id. ¶ 8.2.10. 
 162. 116 F. Supp. 2d 13 (D.D.C. 2000), aff’d in part sub nom. McKesson HBOC, Inc. v. 
Islamic Republic of Iran, 271 F.3d 1101 (D.C. Cir. 2001), vacated in part, 320 F.3d 280 
(D.C. Cir. 2003). 
 163. See id. at 36. 
 164. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 712 
cmt. (d) (1987). 
 165. See LUKE ERIC PETERSON & ROSS GARLAND, RIGHTS & DEMOCRACY, BILATERAL 
INVESTMENT TREATIES AND LAND REFORM IN SOUTH AFRICA 13 (2010), available at 
http://www.business-humanrights.org/Links/Repository/1001485. 
 166. See SCHACHTER, supra note 148 at 324. 
 167. See supra notes 110–14 and accompanying text. 
 168. See supra notes 116–54 and accompanying text. 
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appropriate value calls for a valuation method that determines the fair 
market value of the asset.169 
C.  The Role of Arbitral Tribunals and International Courts 
Having discussed the proper standard to determine “just compensation” 
under international law, this Note now addresses the question of what is the 
proper method for determining “just compensation” with respect to 
creeping expropriation.  Yet, before discussing this issue in Parts II–IV, it is 
worth briefly considering the role the adjudicatory process has played in 
complicating what constitutes “just compensation” for creeping 
expropriation. 
It is generally accepted that expropriation of a foreign investor’s asset “is 
a matter of international law and not of national law.”170  Therefore, 
expropriation claimants can bring their claims in several different forums 
depending on the language of the relevant BIT.171  Such forums include 
national courts, international courts, and more commonly one of several 
international arbitration arenas.172  These diverse forums have led to 
adjudicators reaching different results under nearly identical textual treaty 
rights.173 
Part of this problem is a result of the arbitral adjudication process.174  
Tribunals commonly hold arbitrations behind closed doors, the resolution 
(and often the dispute itself) is kept secret, appeals are limited, and many 
decisions are not published.175  While investor-state arbitrations have been 
publicized much more than other types of arbitrations, providing a greater 
amount of precedent available for tribunals to consider,176 there are still a 
rather minute number of published decisions dealing with creeping 
expropriation.  Additionally, only a small portion of these cases even 
discusses how to determine the appropriate remedy when a creeping 
expropriation has occurred.  Lastly, arbitration does not follow the doctrine 
of stare decisis,177 meaning that all tribunal decisions are nonbinding 
 
 169. See supra notes 155–66 and accompanying text.  This Note discusses the numerous 
valuation methods used in practice in Part II.B.1, below, although as Part II.B.2 discusses, 
these are not necessarily the most appropriate methods. 
 170. MARBOE, supra note 16, ¶ 3.04. 
 171. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
 172. See supra note 53 and accompanying text; see also Rutledge, supra note 90, at 161 
(“Over the last two decades, the number of BIT arbitrations has skyrocketed.  Indirect 
expropriation claims have become an increasingly popular theory to advance in such 
arbitrations.”). 
 173. See Franck, supra note 12, at 55–56. 
 174. See Stiglitz, supra note 54, at 540–41 (arguing that the dispute resolution process for 
arbitral tribunals falls short of the “best practices” found in the legal systems of Western 
democracies). 
 175. See Rutledge, supra note 90, at 161–62; Stiglitz, supra note 54, at 541. 
 176. See Franck, supra note 12, at 74 & nn.105–06 (“[I]nvestment treaty arbitration has 
no fewer than three websites, a new Westlaw database dedicated to publishing awards and 
organizations dedicated to obtaining and distributing information about awards.”). 
 177. See W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Toward a Theory of Precedent in Arbitration, 51 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 1895, 1908 (2010). 
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anyway.178  Each of these factors makes it difficult to build upon any form 
of precedent or resolve contradicting decisions.179  Additionally, arbitrators 
typically resort to expert opinions in valuing damages, but are not obligated 
to rely on any particular view or opinion.180  Rather, the tribunal can make 
the award based on its own understanding of the different valuations 
presented.181 
Other adjudicatory issues arise from problems inherent in BITs and the 
issue of creeping expropriation, which is what Part II of this Note examines.  
BITs invoke ambiguous terms182 that, coupled with no doctrine of stare 
decisis and a lack of published decisions, allow different arbitration panels 
to reach opposite, yet binding, conclusions.183  Similarly, reaching 
agreement as to whether a series of events has resulted in an indirect 
expropriation giving rise to state responsibility (let alone at what moment in 
time the taking officially occurs) is a difficult decision that has resulted in 
adjudicatory discrepancies.184  These problems may be part of the reason 
why there is inconsistency in successfully determining what equates to “just 
compensation” in situations of creeping expropriation.  Part II discusses 
such inconsistencies and explains how they arose through difficulties in 
applying current standards to creeping expropriations. 
II.  FITTING A SQUARE PEG INTO A ROUND HOLE:  APPLYING CURRENT 
INTERNATIONAL LAW STANDARDS TO CREEPING EXPROPRIATIONS AND ITS 
INCONSISTENCIES IN PROVIDING JUST COMPENSATION 
Most BITs state that providing “just compensation” is achieved upon 
awarding the fair market value of the asset.  Part II examines the difficulties 
that have arisen in trying to properly accomplish this task in cases of 
creeping expropriation.  These difficulties have arisen for two reasons.  Part 
II.A considers the first, which is the difficulty of determining a moment in 
time to value the asset.  Part II.B then considers the problems surrounding 
the use of various valuation formulas when calculating fair market value. 
A.  Temporal Inconsistencies in Determining When to Value the Investment 
This section focuses on temporal issues that have arisen in cases trying to 
determine the moment at which a creeping expropriation happens.  It begins 
by discussing international law’s current “moment of expropriation” 
 
 178. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 77, at 1537 (“The doctrine of precedent, 
under which a court must follow earlier judicial decisions when the same points arise again 
in litigation.”). 
 179. See Stiglitz, supra note 54, at 541. 
 180. See Abdala & Spiller, supra note 9, at 448. 
 181. See id. 
 182. This Note’s effort to discern and clarify the ambiguous term “just compensation” 
serves as an immediate example of this problem. 
 183. See Stiglitz, supra note 54, at 541. 
 184. See Burns H. Weston, “Constructive Takings” Under International Law:  A Modest 
Foray into the Problem of “Creeping Expropriation,” 16 VA. J. INT’L L. 103, 105–06 
(1975). 
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standard to determine the time an asset is valued and then discusses the 
inconsistent results that have occurred when trying to apply this standard to 
creeping expropriations.   
1.  The “Moment of Expropriation” as the Current Timing Standard 
In order to provide an appropriate remedy, a trier of fact must determine 
the value of the expropriated asset.  Otherwise, the tribunal will be unable 
to tell the actual value the foreign investor has lost.  A key component to 
the valuation process is the moment in time in which to determine the 
asset’s value.185  There are several reasons why the valuation date is 
significant.  First, an asset’s value fluctuates constantly over time.186  Value 
changes as new information becomes available, whether the information is 
systematic or idiosyncratic, and investors price in this new information.187  
Second, valuation methods ignore all changes to the investment’s value 
subsequent to the valuation date.188  Third, for investments with a limited 
life span, adjusting the date of valuation alters the remaining profitable life 
the investment has.189  Thus, the date chosen to value the asset may have 
large ramifications on the size of the investor’s award.190 
Under current standards, valuation is done at the “moment of 
expropriation.”191  The language of most BITs considers the moment of 
expropriation as the point in time immediately before the expropriation took 
place.192  International law also supports this view, which the tribunal in 
Compania del Desarrollo de Santa Elena S.A. v. Republic of Costa Rica193 
expressed by stating that “[t]he expropriated property is to be evaluated as 
of the date on which the governmental ‘interference’ has deprived the 
owner of his rights or has made those rights practically useless.”194  The 
Restatement on Foreign Relations Law also supports this proposition.195 
The World Bank guidelines on the treatment of FDI196 offers further 
support by stating that “[c]ompensation will be deemed ‘adequate’ if it is 
 
 185. See MARBOE, supra note 16, ¶ 3.250. 
 186. See id. 
 187. See RIPINSKY & WILLIAMS, supra note 102, at 243. 
 188. See id. (using Sempra Energy International v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/02/16, Award (Sept. 28 2007), as an example). 
 189. See id. 
 190. See id. 
 191. See Reisman & Sloane, supra note 19, at 128. 
 192. See, e.g., U.S. MODEL BIT, supra note 42, art. 6(2)(b) (“[Compensation shall] be 
equivalent to the fair market value of the expropriated investment immediately before the 
expropriation took place . . . .”); CANADIAN MODEL BIT, supra note 104, art. 13(2) (“Such 
compensation shall be equivalent to the fair market value of the expropriated investment 
immediately before the expropriation took place . . . .”). 
 193. ICSID Case No. ARB/96/1, Award (Feb. 17, 2000), 15 ICSID Rev. 169 (2000). 
 194. Id. ¶ 78. 
 195. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 712 
cmt. (d) (1987). 
 196. 2 WORLD BANK, LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE TREATMENT OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT:  
REPORT TO THE DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE AND GUIDELINES ON THE TREATMENT OF FOREIGN 
DIRECT INVESTMENT (1992), available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDS
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based on the fair market value of the taken asset as such value is determined 
immediately before the time at which the taking occurred or the decision to 
take the asset became publicly known.”197  This quote also states the one 
exception to this rule under some treaties, which is that if knowledge of the 
expropriation was public prior to the act of expropriation, then the moment 
of valuation is the time immediately before the decision to take the asset 
became known publicly.198  Historically, the “moment of expropriation” 
rule has made sense because it seems obvious that the valuation date for an 
expropriation should be the moment that the expropriation occurs and the 
investor’s asset is lost.199 
However, choosing a specific moment of expropriation is not easily 
applied to situations of creeping expropriation, where the deprivation does 
not occur at one particular instant.200  Because creeping expropriation 
involves a series of acts or omissions that only deprive the investor of his 
asset when aggregated, the exact moment of expropriation will rarely be 
identifiable.201 
W. Michael Reisman and Robert D. Sloane explain that an unclear 
moment of expropriation can lead to a windfall for either the investor or the 
host country depending on when the tribunal decides that the moment of 
expropriation occurred.202  If a tribunal selects a moment of expropriation 
earlier on in the series of acts, then the investor may receive a windfall.203  
An earlier date may cause the tribunal to assess the asset prior to some acts 
that reduced the value, but were nonetheless lawful.204  Here, the investor 
will receive compensation from the host state for lost value resulting from 




 197. Id. art. IV(3) (emphasis added). 
 198. See U.S.-Argentina BIT, supra note 157, art. 4 (“Compensation shall be equivalent 
to the fair market value of the expropriated investment immediately before the expropriatory 
action was taken or became known, whichever is earlier . . . .”); see also Treaty Concerning 
the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, U.S.-Russ., art. 3(1), 
June 17, 1992, available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/usa_russia.pdf 
(“Compensation shall be equivalent to the fair market value of the expropriated investment 
immediately before the expropriatory action was taken or became known . . . .”); Agreement 
for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, U.K.-Pan., art. 5(1), Oct. 7, 1983, available 
at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/uk_panama.pdf (“[C]ompensation shall 
amount to the fair value which the investment expropriated had immediately before the 
expropriation became known.”); 2 WORLD BANK, supra note 196, art. IV(3) (“Compensation 
will be deemed ‘adequate’ if it is based on the fair market value of the taken asset as such 
value is determined immediately before the time at which the taking occurred or the decision 
to take the asset became publicly known.”). But see U.S. MODEL BIT, supra note 42, art. 6(2) 
(“The compensation referred to in paragraph 1(c) shall . . . not reflect any change in value 
occurring because the intended expropriation had become known earlier . . . .”). 
 199. See MARBOE, supra note 16, ¶ 3.253. 
 200. See id. ¶ 3.278. 
 201. See Reisman & Sloane, supra note 19, at 133. 
 202. See id. at 144. 
 203. See id. 
 204. See supra note 188 and accompanying text. 
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is important to remember that many legal regulatory acts can reduce an 
asset’s worth without obligating the state to provide compensation, such as 
a daily emissions cap that causes a reduction in overall output. 
Using similar logic, one sees that a later expropriation date may provide a 
windfall to the host country.  Because the initial acts of the expropriatory 
series gradually reduce the property’s value,205 the state gets away with not 
paying for some of the effect that its expropriatory acts had on the asset.  In 
both scenarios, one of the parties receives a windfall from the creeping 
expropriation, which undermines the purpose of providing for protections 
against expropriations in the first place.206 
Therefore, in matters of creeping expropriation, the point in time that the 
tribunal selects as the “moment of expropriation” can have large 
ramifications on the award given.  Indeed, the court in SEDCO Inc. v. 
National Iranian Oil Co.207 recognized this fact and the importance of 
determining a proper moment of expropriation since, “the value of the 
shareholders’ expropriated interest may change dramatically during the 
surrounding time.”208 
Another consideration that adds to this issue is that many investors will 
incur additional expenses trying to rescue or fortify an investment that has 
been hindered by a regulatory act that, unbeknownst to the investor at the 
time, is the beginning of an expropriation.209  In response to an injurious 
government action, many investors rationally use additional capital to 
support the investment.210  This is particularly the case in situations where 
government officials provide assurances that further acts are unlikely to 
occur.211 
One may argue that using additional capital in response to an initial 
injurious act, with the possibility of further acts to come, is simply a 
business risk that investors assume.  However, one might also argue that 
compensatory awards for the expropriation should consider these additional 
costs.  Otherwise, the incentive is for individuals to limit their capital 
investment since attempting to keep it afloat only further hurts the 
investor’s chances of receiving a full recovery down the line.212 
 
 205. Cf. Reisman & Sloane, supra note 19, at 144 (discussing how some investors attempt 
to rescue their investment because an initial act has hindered the investment but not made it 
entirely valueless). 
 206. See id. (stating that the goal of BITs would be ill-served by a policy that rewards 
creeping expropriations). 
 207. 9 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 248 (1985). 
 208. Id. at 278. 
 209. See Reisman & Sloane, supra note 19, at 144. 
 210. See id. 
 211. See id. 
 212. See Vance R. Koven, Expropriation and the ‘Jurisprudence’ of OPIC, 22 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 269, 277 (1981) (“Since it is the value of the foreign enterprise at the date of 
expropriation that is compensable, the more stoically the foreign enterprise hangs on in the 
face of host government interference, the more it hurts its chances of recovering the full 
value of its business.”). 
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2.  Cases Addressing the Temporal Issue 
Several creeping expropriation cases evidence the difficulty in choosing a 
specific “moment of expropriation” when considering their inconsistent 
conclusions.  Some tribunals decide that the moment of expropriation 
occurs near the beginning of the expropriatory acts.  In SEDCO, the U.S.-
Iran Claims Tribunal concluded that the “moment of expropriation” was an 
act earlier on in the process of depriving SEDCO of its investment.213  
SEDCO owned 50 percent of a joint venture called Sediran to operate land 
drilling rigs in Iran.214  Sediran had multiple contracts with the National 
Iranian Oil Company (NIOC);215 however, disagreements between the 
NIOC and SEDCO led the NIOC to deny SEDCO access to Sediran’s funds 
in the fall of 1979.216  In November of 1979, Iran then appointed its own 
temporary directors to replace the current Sediran directors.217  Nine 
months later, Iran took full control of Sediran under the Protection and 
Development of Iranian Industries Act.218 
Despite SEDCO not losing full control of the company until this final act, 
the tribunal found that the second act of inserting temporary managers was 
the moment of expropriation and must serve as the date of valuation.  The 
tribunal concluded, “When, as in the instant case, the seizure of control by 
appointment of ‘temporary’ managers clearly ripens into an outright taking 
of title, the date of appointment presumptively should be regarded as the 
date of taking.”219 
The tribunal in Amoco also found the moment of expropriation to be 
earlier on in the process.220  In this instance, Amoco entered into a joint 
venture with the National Petrochemical Company (NPC), an Iranian 
subsidiary of NIOC, to explore offshore oil fields.221  The joint company 
was named Khemco.222  Due to the turbulent political climate from the 
Iranian Revolution, NPC publicly announced that it would try to buy out 
Amoco in April 1979.223  One month later the NPC chairman stated that 
Amoco expatriates who had previously left the country for safety were no 
longer permitted to return, and in June he stated that NPC would manage 
the sale of all products.224  NPC then unilaterally took over the operations 
 
 213. See SEDCO, Inc. v. Nat’l Iranian Oil Co., 9 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 248 (1985). 
 214. See id. at 259–60. 
 215. See id. at 266. 
 216. See id. at 276–77. 
 217. See id. at 277. 
 218. See id. at 264–65. 
 219. Id. at 278; cf. Starrett Hous. Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 4 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. 
Rep. 122, 154 (1983) (“There can be little doubt that at least at the end of January 1980 the 
Claimants had been deprived of the effective use, control and benefits of their property rights 
. . . [b]y that time the Ministry of Housing had appointed  [a] Temporary Manager . . . .”). 
 220. See Amoco Int’l Fin. Corp. v. Iran, 15 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 189 (1987). 
 221. See id. ¶¶ 28–29. 
 222. See id. 
 223. See id. ¶¶ 52–57. 
 224. See id. ¶ 61. 
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of Khemco in July of 1979.225  Similar to the outcome in SEDCO, the 
Iranian government directly expropriated Khemco on January 8, 1980.226  
The tribunal concluded, however, that this was not a case of a direct 
expropriation despite the Iranian government’s actions.227  Rather, the 
expropriation was a process that “officially” occurred when NPC took over 
the operations of Khemco in July 1979.228  In reaching this date, the 
tribunal stated that “the date to be considered for the valuation of such 
compensation will be the date at which measures definitively took effect, 
rather than the date of the final decision of nationalization.”229  In both of 
these instances, the tribunal chose the “moment of expropriation” to be 
earlier in the series of actions. 
The ILC Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts230 also supports the view of placing the “moment of expropriation” as 
the first incident in the series.  Article 15(1) of this treaty states that “[t]he 
breach of an international obligation by a State through a series of actions 
or omissions defined in aggregate as wrongful occurs when the action or 
omission occurs which, taken with the other actions or omissions, is 
sufficient to constitute the wrongful act.”231  The Article then goes on to 
state that “[i]n such a case, the breach extends over the entire period starting 
with the first of the actions or omissions of the series.”232  Therefore, when 
a wrongful deprivation takes place through a series of acts, Article 15(1) 
may consider the expropriation to be when the first act occurs. 
Conversely, there are other tribunal decisions that chose the moment of 
expropriation to be near the end of the regulatory acts.  The tribunal in 
International Technical Products v. Iran233 made such a decision.  In this 
case, the plaintiff claimed ownership of an apartment building in Tehran 
that a bank expropriated through the approval and participation of the 
Iranian government.234  The tribunal questioned the specific role certain 
governmental agents played in the taking of the building, but it ultimately 
held: 
Where the alleged expropriation is carried out by way of a series of 
interferences in the enjoyment of the property, the breach forming the 
cause of action is deemed to take place on the day when the interference 
has ripened into more or less irreversible deprivation of the property 
rather than on the beginning date of the events.235 
 
 225. See id. ¶¶ 62–67. 
 226. See id. ¶ 72. 
 227. See id. ¶¶ 180–81. 
 228. See id. ¶ 181. 
 229. Id. 
 230. G.A. Res. 56/83, 53d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83 (Jan. 28, 2002), available at 
http://www.undemocracy.com/A-RES-56-83.pdf. 
 231. Id. art. 15(1). 
 232. Id. art. 15(2). 
 233. 9 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 206 (1985). 
 234. See id. at 230. 
 235. See id. at 240–41. 
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The tribunal in Tippets v. TAMS-AFFA Consulting Engineers of Iran236 
had a similar holding.  This case concerned another Iranian joint venture 
where the U.S. engineering company Tippetts, Abbett, McCarthy, Stratton 
(TAMS) partnered with Aziz Farmanfarmaian and Associates (AFFA) to 
form TAMS-AFFA that would perform architectural and engineering 
services on the Tehran International Airport in August 1975.237  Work 
stopped in early 1979 because of the Iranian Revolution.238  In July 1979, 
the Iranian government appointed a temporary manager to TAMS-
AFFA.239  TAMS made several attempts in January and February 1980 to 
correspond with TAMS-AFFA about continuing work on the airport but 
never received a response.240  Additionally, TAMS-AFFA ceased all 
communications with TAMS by December 1979, including announcing the 
venture’s finances.241  Despite the appointment of temporary managers in 
July of 1979, the tribunal determined that the series of events did not result 
in an expropriation until March 1, 1980.242  Unlike the first several cases, 
these decisions determined that the moment of expropriation is more 
appropriate near the end of the series of acts. 
As these cases show, because the prevailing standard is to decipher a 
specific moment of expropriation to serve as the time of valuation, tribunals 
have found themselves handcuffed with attempting to choose a moment of 
expropriation that is not readily discernible.243  Not only has this problem 
led to inconsistent decisions, but it is also still unclear how future tribunals 
should decide the point in time at which to value the expropriated asset. 
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that there is not a large debate over the 
temporal issue that these cases portray.  In fact, the Reisman and Sloane 
article discussed above is the only major article attempting to address this 
problem.244  This may indicate either that tribunals are not concerned with 
this issue, or that an alternative method to determine when to value an 
expropriated asset does not seem as efficient.  Vance R. Koven implied that 
there might not be a better alternative when he wrote that “[f]or ‘creeping’ 
expropriation . . . determining the date on which ‘an action’ created that 
result is an absurd exercise, but one of extreme importance because of the 
principles of compensation at work in the Contract.”245 
B.  Difficulties in Applying the Many Methods of Valuation 
This section considers the second difficulty in attempting to provide “just 
compensation.”  Tribunals have used numerous different valuation formulas 
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when calculating fair market value, and this fact has contributed to the 
problem of inconsistent adjudicatory awards.  It first discusses the various 
valuation methods that tribunals consider acceptable to use and then 
examines how application of these different methods to creeping 
expropriations has created inconsistent outcomes.   
1.  Acceptable Valuation Methods 
The only thing that may be more important than the point in time at 
which to value an asset is the valuation method used.  While BITs, 
international law, and the Restatement generally state that fair market value 
is the appropriate means for determining “just compensation,” all are 
essentially silent as to the valuation method that should be used to 
determine fair market value.246  In general, tribunals see fair market value 
as the price at which the investment would change hands in an open and 
unrestricted market between a willing buyer and seller, absent compulsion, 
and with the parties having reasonable knowledge of the facts.247  This 
basic premise, though, does not explain what tools to use in deciding the 
price a hypothetical buyer and seller should reach.248  Case law has shown 
that, depending on the facts, courts and tribunals may use one of several 
different valuation methods to provide fair market value.249 
There are a few preferred choices for asset valuation.  The first valuation 
method used in determining fair market value is examining existing markets 
for the asset under consideration.250  Unfortunately, there is not a readily 
liquid market for many types of foreign investments.251  In Amoco, for 
example, the tribunal commented that determining what a willing buyer and 
seller would pay when the market does not actually exist makes the concept 
of determining “fair market value” ambiguous.252  The tribunal went on to 
state that in such instances they must utilize alternative methods of 
valuation, even if they cannot reach a legitimate market value.253 
Several such alternative valuation methods exist.  The most popular 
method is Discount Cash Flow (DCF) analysis.254  This form of analysis 
uses historical profitability to predict future cash flows and then discounts 
these flows back to present value.255  Some tribunals choose instead to use 
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the Direct Capitalization method, which is similar to DCF analysis but 
relies less on income projections several years into the future and other 
speculative elements.256  A third method examines “comparable” firms as a 
proxy to value the expropriated asset.257  Each of these methods, however, 
requires the asset to have a “going concern value,” which generally refers to 
the principle that a willing buyer would pay a premium for the asset under 
the belief that the asset has future profitability.258 
If the investment is not a going concern, or there is not enough historical 
information to properly project future cash flows,259 then tribunals cannot 
properly utilize these main valuation options (hereinafter referred to as “top 
tier methods”) and will look to alternative valuation methods.260  This other 
group of methods includes using (1) the “book value,” or net value if one 
was to sell only the bare physical assets, (2) the “replacement value,” or the 
amount needed to undertake a similar venture at this point in time, (3) the 
“liquidation value” or amount a party would receive if all of the assets were 
liquidated less any outstanding liabilities that the enterprise has, and (4) the 
amount of capital actually invested prior to expropriation (hereinafter 
referred to as “second tier methods”).261 
2.  Difficulties in Applying These Methods to Creeping Expropriation 
Arbitral tribunals have considered and utilized all of the above valuation 
methods in cases of expropriation and they currently serve as the range of 
acceptable methods under international law.  Yet, using these numerous 
techniques leads to conflicting results.262  For example, one author stated 
that tribunals almost invariably use a method that treats the asset as a going 
concern,263 where a premium is placed over the asset’s book value (a 
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second tier valuation method) to account for lost future profits.264  Thomas 
Merrill states that as a result, valuations using these methods, like DCF 
analysis, will produce larger awards, which the foreign investor presumably 
prefers.265  Likewise, second tier methods would produce lower awards, 
which the host state presumably prefers.266 
Merrill also argues that these methods do not translate well to 
investments taken via a creeping expropriation.267  Valuation methods that 
rely on variables such as going concern value, the worth of physical assets, 
and declared tax value are tailored toward expropriations where the host 
country takes full possession of the property.268  Merrill notes that when the 
government does not take possession of property, but merely diminishes its 
value through its actions, these factors are less important.269  As an 
example, if the host country expropriates an asset such as a factory through 
nationalization, the value of the equipment taken is vital to provide proper 
compensation.  Several of the valuation methods discussed above (DCF, 
DCAP, book value, replacement value, liquidation value) consider the value 
of this equipment.  However, if the expropriation results merely from a 
series of regulations that no longer allows the factory to operate, then the 
investor is still in control of the equipment.  The deprivation did not occur 
through having the equipment taken away, but from no longer being able to 
use the equipment productively.  In this situation, it likely does not matter 
that the valuation methods consider equipment value in the calculations. 
Additionally, these valuation methods become more speculative when a 
tribunal is dealing with a series of acts that caused the deprivation rather 
than a singular direct taking.  Joseph Stiglitz has argued that numerous 
factors influence market value, so it is difficult to determine how much 
diminution in value is attributable to the expropriatory acts and how much 
is attributable to other factors.270  For example, suppose that the people of a 
country are pushing for a green movement and advocate that consumers use 
more environmentally safe products.  Simultaneously, the government 
passes a new tax on consumers who dispose of pollutants, and both of these 
factors independently reduce the demand for toxic waste dumps.  An 
assessor valuing a toxic waste dump would be required to determine what 
percentage of the loss in market value is a result of the tax and what 
percentage is a result of the citizens’ grass roots movement.  Not only is 
trying to make this determination speculative but the valuation methods 
discussed above are not equipped to even consider such a problem.271 
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This becomes even more complex if one must consider whether a decline 
in value was a derivative result of a regulatory act.  For example, assume 
that there was no green movement or tax on disposing of pollutants, but 
rather a tax on consumers purchasing goods that produce toxic waste.  If 
there was a decrease in demand for toxic waste dumps the assessor must 
determine to what degree it was caused by consumers purchasing less toxic 
waste producing goods as a result of the tax, a change in consumer 
preference to goods that do not produce toxic waste for other reasons, or a 
change in consumer preference to use alternative waste dumping methods.  
This shows how the decline in demand for toxic waste dumps could have 
resulted from several other factors besides the government’s regulatory act 
on consumers and how the process of attributing cause can be complex and 
difficult. 
As Part II explained, international law’s current doctrine for determining 
“just compensation” for expropriation under BITs is not well suited to the 
more narrow area of creeping expropriation.  Tribunals analyzing BITs and 
international law have developed a specific standard for determining the 
valuation date and a series of acceptable valuation methods, but these both 
are tailored towards compensating direct expropriations.  This is 
understandable given the much older history of direct expropriation,272 but 
a framework that now creates unpredictable results for the most common 
form of expropriation undermines the primary purpose of having BITs.273  
Part III provides some alternative methodologies that may be more 
applicable to indirect (and in particular creeping) expropriations. 
III.  ALTERNATIVE TEMPORAL AND VALUATION METHODS SPECIFICALLY 
FOR CREEPING EXPROPRIATIONS 
This part discusses several suggestions proposed by scholars that would 
increase consistency amongst adjudications of indirect expropriations.  Part 
III.A proposes alternative strategies to address the temporal issue and why 
these strategies might reduce the inconsistencies that the current doctrine 
produces.  Part III.B then suggests alternative valuation methods that 
attempt to deal with the problems that current valuation strategies create. 
A.  Alternatives to Selecting a “Moment of Expropriation” 
International law and most BITs establish that tribunals should valuate 
expropriated assets at the “moment of expropriation.”274  This is a 
straightforward method for direct expropriations; however, as explained 
above, this method becomes complicated when there is no clearly 
demarcated moment.275  Although several scholars recognize the concerns 
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over the current “moment of expropriation” ideology,276 there are few 
suggestions for alternative methods.277 
Reisman and Sloane make the most well-known suggestion.  They 
propose that in situations of creeping expropriation the valuation date 
should be separated from the expropriation date.278  Separating the two 
moments would distinguish the question of liability from the question of 
damages and work in preventing either party from attaining some sort of 
windfall.279  These authors suggest that rather than having a bright line for 
the exact moment of valuation, the tribunal should choose any date within 
the series of events that would provide a fair market value sufficient to 
make the investor whole.280  Irmgard Marboe also offers an alternative 
method, which is a tweaked interpretation of Reisman and Sloane’s 
suggestion.281  Under her interpretation, the moment of expropriation 
should be the end of the series of acts while the moment of valuation should 
be at the beginning.282 
B.  Alternative Valuation Methods 
While arbitral tribunals and international courts have utilized numerous 
different valuation methods depending on the facts of the case,283 each 
method is more applicable to valuing an asset that the host country has 
completely and directly taken from the investor.284  In efforts to address 
creeping expropriation, methods that are analogous to, but slightly different 
from, the current standards have been proposed. 
Thomas Merrill suggests adapting two methods that U.S. case law has 
adopted to address partial regulatory takings.285  Since creeping and indirect 
expropriations do not actually take physical possession of the assets there is 
essentially only a partial deprivation.286  The acts only deprive the investor 
of the opportunity to benefit from the investment.287  Merrill states that this 
is analogous to regulatory takings, which is a subcategory of eminent 
domain under U.S. constitutional law.288  Given that fact, tribunals can 
apply current U.S. jurisprudence for regulatory takings to cases of creeping 
expropriation.289 
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Merrill’s first suggested method is the U.S. partial takings model.290  
This method takes a snapshot of the fair market value of the property (under 
the book value method)291 prior to the regulatory actions, then takes a 
second snapshot after the acts, and awards the difference in value.292  Such 
a procedure shifts the focus of the valuation process from determining what 
the host government physically took—which the valuation methods are 
generally more suited for293—to what the investor has lost.  Rather than 
providing the investor with the fair market value of the asset, he is only 
receiving the value that he lost as a result of the host country’s actions.294 
Merrill’s second suggestion is based off the Public Utility Model.295  
This model is similar to the DCF method; however, it requires two separate 
calculations of the going concern value (the expected market return).296  
The going concern value is first calculated for the investment after the 
various governmental acts.297  A second going concern calculation is then 
done for a hypothetical firm in a competitive market with the same level of 
risk and absent the governmental actions.298  The award granted is then the 
difference between these two values.299  Utilizing this method would 
ideally make the investor as whole as she would have been if acting in a 
competitive market where the expropriatory acts never occurred.300 
IV.  THE NEED FOR NEW METHODS TO DETERMINE “JUST COMPENSATION” 
AND THE SUITABILITY OF SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVES 
The final part of this Note argues that a change to current practices is 
needed, and it considers whether the suggested alternatives can effectively 
help make this change.  Part IV.A discusses why different methodologies 
are necessary to better provide “just compensation” for creeping 
expropriations.  Part IV.B considers the benefits and drawbacks of 
implementing the alternative methods discussed in Part III for addressing 
the temporal issue, suggests possible tweaks to the proposed methods, and 
introduces a new solution using multiple “moments of expropriation.”  Part 
IV.C then discusses the suggested alternative valuation methods from Part 
III and argues for either their use or the use of regression analysis for 
valuation purposes. 
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A.  The Current Standards for Determining “Just Compensation” for 
Creeping Expropriations Need To Be Altered 
The inconsistencies resulting from using current international legal 
standards in cases of creeping expropriation have undermined the primary 
purpose of BITs.301  BITs are implemented as an attempt to induce 
additional FDI in the signatory countries,302 which they arguably do by 
offering several protections including the promise of “just compensation” 
when a host country expropriates an asset.303  Unfortunately, under the 
current international legal standards, there is no clear guidance to help 
tribunals determine when an expropriated asset should be valued.304  
Moreover, tribunals can freely choose between a multitude of valuation 
formulas, each of which alters the amount of compensation awarded.305  
Because of these ambiguities, foreign investors will likely be less confident 
that BITs will actually provide the protections they claim to. 
Reduced confidence in BITs has the consequential effect of diminishing 
the level of FDI a host country would otherwise receive.  These problems 
arise from the fact that creeping expropriations deprive investors of their 
asset in a completely different manner than direct expropriations do,306 yet 
adjudicatory bodies still attempt to provide compensation using the same 
methods in both situations.  Implementing alternative standards aimed to 
specifically address the way creeping expropriations affect investments 
should address the problem.  If they can diminish the inconsistencies across 
tribunal decisions then the result should be increased FDI in the countries 
that signed the BIT. 
Moreover, it should not be difficult to begin implementing alternative 
methods given the lack of binding precedent in this field.307  The vast 
majority of BIT adjudications take place through arbitration, which does not 
have the doctrine of stare decisis binding future tribunals to the 
methodologies of past ones.308  Additionally, there is minimal published 
case law discussing the methods to determine “just compensation” in cases 
of creeping expropriation.  A lack of extensive historical support for the 
current international standards may mean that the international community 
would be more open to adopting newer methodologies, particularly if they 
result in awards that are more consistent across tribunals.  Assuming that 
the international legal community would be receptive to implementing 
alternative methods, one must select an alternative that addresses the timing 
and calculation problems. 
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B.  The Suitability of the Proposed “Moment of Expropriation” Alternatives 
The few proposed alternatives to the current “moment of expropriation” 
standard involve separating the valuation and expropriation date.309  The 
strongest suggestion is Reisman and Sloane’s proposition that upon finding 
that a creeping expropriation has occurred, the tribunal should choose any 
date over the course of events that best provides a fair market value.310  
This standard offers several benefits.  First, this method eliminates the rule 
of linking the moment of valuation with the moment of expropriation—a 
rigid rule that is clearly applicable to direct expropriations, but creates 
unavoidable complications for indirect ones.  Second, eliminating the 
requirement to choose a specific moment of expropriation allows the 
tribunal to consider the appropriate valuation date on a case-by-case basis 
while avoiding the risk of one party receiving some sort of unearned 
benefit.311  Reisman and Sloane’s method also seems more appropriate than 
Marboe’s interpretation, which places the moment of expropriation at the 
end of the series of acts and the moment of valuation at the beginning.312  
Under Reisman and Sloane’s method, the moment of expropriation would 
merely serve as a conclusion that an expropriation took place, while the 
moment of valuation serves as the pertinent date.  However, making the 
valuation date always at the first act exacerbates the central problem of one 
party receiving an undeserved windfall.313 
The major drawback to Reisman and Sloane’s method, however, is the 
concern that valuation inconsistencies will persist because each tribunal can 
arbitrarily choose a specific valuation date.  This new method may provide 
more possible days upon which the valuation can occur than the current 
method, but it still ultimately allows the tribunal to select a valuation 
moment either too early or too late in the expropriation process. 
An alternative solution to the moment of expropriation problem could be 
utilizing a series of valuations at numerous dates as opposed to one specific 
date.  The asset could be valued several times during the series of 
expropriatory events, either at proportionate intervals, or at the beginning 
and end of each act up until the expropriation claim is made or the series of 
acts is over.  The result would be a series of valuations that show how the 
regulatory acts creating the expropriation diminished the asset’s value over 
time.  The tribunal could then consider these different valuations and reach 
a middle ground, perhaps by averaging the valuations or using some other 
formula that the tribunal thinks will produce a just outcome. 
The major drawback to this solution is the heavy resources likely 
required.  Doing a proper valuation, no matter the method used, requires 
time and money.  Consequently, trying to do multiple valuations multiplies 
the cost and time needed. 
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However, this approach could rectify the issues that the current standard 
creates.314  Attempting to choose a particular moment of expropriation in 
cases of creeping expropriation seems illogical given that none of the acts 
alone amount to a taking of property.315  Rather, the problem with creeping 
expropriation is that an investor loses the ability to profit off her asset over 
time.316  This timing approach attempts to account for this fact.  In cases of 
creeping expropriation, the investor is still able to gain from the investment 
to some degree during the expropriatory process, and likewise the 
government is not depriving the investor of her entire asset throughout the 
process.317  Compensating at a level considered a “middle ground” for this 
partial deprivation works towards eliminating any potential windfalls to 
either side and accounts for the fact that throughout the expropriation 
process the host country did not completely inhibit the investor from 
benefiting off the investment. 
C.  The Suitability of the Proposed Valuation Method Alternatives 
In regards to methods of valuing an expropriated asset, Merrill offered 
two alternatives when creeping expropriation is involved.318  His first 
suggestion was based off the U.S. partial takings model, where there are 
two snapshots taken of the assets value, with the difference being awarded 
as compensation.319  This method is better suited for creeping 
expropriations than the current methods because it shifts the focus from the 
overall value of the asset to the value the investor lost.320  The unique 
aspect of creeping expropriations is that the investor still maintains physical 
possession of the investment.321  Rather than losing the physical value of 
the asset, it is the inability to use the investment—in other words a loss of 
benefit—that harms the investor.322  While the current valuation methods 
focus on physical value, the partial takings method focuses on lost value.323  
Additionally, this method may also address the temporal problem because it 
considers to what degree the acts deprived the investor of his investment 
over time instead of at one point in time.  The major drawback to this 
method, though, is its reliance upon determining the book value at two 
different times.324  Implementing this method therefore means that the 
valuation would not account for any potential lost profits or for a lost 
opportunity, two components that usually produce larger awards.325 
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Merrill’s other suggested method is a variation of the U.S. Public Utility 
Model, where the going concern value is determined for the investment as 
well as a hypothetical investment in a competitive market and absent the 
expropriatory actions.326  Using this method will allow a tribunal to 
examine the direct impact each action causing the expropriation had on the 
investment, helping to address the speculation concern that the diminution 
in value resulted from some other act besides the governmental ones.327  
This method may also better consider the loss in opportunity that a creeping 
expropriation causes but that traditional valuation methods do not take into 
account.328  On the other hand, some tribunals may find having to make 
these calculations with a hypothetical firm too speculative.  Moreover, 
determining a value for a hypothetical investment in a competitive market 
may undervalue the investor’s loss if the investment existed in a 
noncompetitive market or if the investor possessed market power. 
A third alternative may be to utilize regression analysis to determine how 
much loss is attributable to each act by the host country.  Conducting 
several regressions where each holds all but one variable constant could 
achieve this end.  This type of analysis would allow the tribunal to 
determine the effect that each act of the creeping expropriation had on 
diminishing the asset’s value, and therefore help to eliminate the 
speculation concern without relying on a hypothetical firm as the Public 
Utility Method necessitates. 
CONCLUSION 
Addressing the problem of economic scarcity and attempting to 
maximize the use of the world’s limited resources is a central task as 
globalization continues.  One popular means to increase economic 
efficiency is promoting FDI that can bring new tools into a productively 
inefficient area.  A major tool that countries use to induce this investment is 
bilateral investment treaties, partly because of the expropriation protections 
they provide.  These provisions protect an investor from having their asset 
unwillingly taken away from them, both directly and indirectly, without 
“just compensation.”  This Note has shown, however, that judicial attempts 
to provide “just compensation” in the context of creeping expropriations 
have produced inconsistent results. 
Current adjudicatory standards for determining when and how to value 
an expropriated asset partly cause this inconsistency because they are 
designed for direct expropriations rather than indirect ones.  The current 
standard of choosing a specific “moment of expropriation” is not easily 
discernible for creeping expropriations and can lead to a windfall for one of 
the parties.  Likewise, the various methods of valuation that tribunals use 
 
 326. See supra notes 295–99 and accompanying text. 
 327. See supra notes 270–71 and accompanying text. 
 328. See supra notes 267–69 and accompanying text. 
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are best suited for expropriations where the host country has actually taken 
the asset, not where the harm is a loss of opportunity. 
This Note has explored and proposed alternative methods geared towards 
creeping expropriation.  These approaches may lead to more consistent 
determinations of what amounts to “just compensation” for cases of 
creeping expropriation.  Suggested methods include separating the moment 
of expropriation from the valuation date or determining compensation from 
multiple valuation dates, and using refashioned valuation methods to better 
account for a loss of future opportunities even though physical possession 
of the asset persists.  By improving consistency across compensatory 
awards for creeping expropriations, tribunals can improve the benefit that 
BITs provide foreign investors and host countries.  This result will 
ultimately increase confidence in investing abroad, which further promotes 
FDI and helps to alleviate the ongoing problem of economic scarcity. 
